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 Probabilistic safety assessment by fault tree analysis has been considered as an 
important tool to evaluate safety systems of nuclear power plants in the last two 
decades. However, since the estimation of failure probabilities of rare events with high 
consequences is the focus of this assessment, it is often very difficult to obtain 
component failure rates, which are specific to the nuclear power plant under evaluation. 
The motivation of this study is how to obtain basic event failure rates when basic events 
do not have historical failure data and expert subjective justifications, which are 
expressed in qualitative failure possibilities, are the only means to evaluate basic event 
failures. 
 This thesis describes a new intelligent hybrid fault tree analysis framework to 
overcome the weaknesses of conventional fault tree analysis, qualitative failure 
possibilities and their corresponding mathematical representations to articulate nuclear 
event failure likelihoods, an area defuzzification technique to decode the membership 
functions of fuzzy sets representing nuclear event failure possibilities into nuclear event 
reliability scores, and a fuzzy reliability approach to generate nuclear event quantitative 
fuzzy failure rates from the corresponding qualitative failure possibilities subjectively 
evaluated by experts. Seven qualitative linguistic terms have been defined to represent 
nuclear event failure possibilities, i.e. very low, low, reasonably low, moderate, 
reasonably high, high, and very high and the corresponding mathematical forms are 
represented by triangular fuzzy numbers, which are defined in the [0, 1] universe of 
discourse based on nuclear event failure data documented in literatures using inductive 
reasoning. Finally, an intelligent software system called InFaTAS-NuSA, which has 
been developed to realize the new intelligence hybrid fault tree analysis framework to 
overcome the limitations of the existing fault tree analysis software systems by 
accepting both quantitative failure probabilities and qualitative failure possibilities, is 
also described in this thesis. 
 The results of the InFaTAS-NuSA evaluation using a real world application 
confirm that InFaTAS-NuSA has yielded similar outputs as the outputs generated by a 
xiv 

well-known fault tree analysis software system, i.e. SAPHIRE, and therefore it can 
overcome the limitation of the existing fault tree analysis software system, which can 
accept only quantitative failure probabilities. The experiment results also show that the 
fuzzy reliability approach seems to be a sound alternative for conventional reliability 
approach to deal with basic events which do not have historical failure data and expert 
subjective opinions are the only means to obtain their failure information. 
